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OBAMA'S EQUIVOCAL DEFENSE OF 
AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 
Kevin M. Stack* 
You can't judge a President by his view of Article IL At the 
very least, only looking to a President's construction of Article II 
gives a misleading portrait of the actual legal authority recent 
Presidents have asserted. 
President Obama is no exception, as revealed by his defense 
of the constitutionality of an independent agency from challenge 
under Article II in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board1 (PCAOB) in the Supreme Court 
this term. The PCAOB is an independent agency, located inside 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), created to regulate 
accounting of public companies in the wake of the WorldCom 
and Enron accounting scandals by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.2 The Supreme Court's decision to review the 
constitutionality of the PCAOB required the Obama 
Administration, in its first year, to take a stance on several issues 
that are viewed as litmus tests for theories of Article II, including 
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Administration's arguments in the PCAOB case for the Administration's construction of 
presidential power was written prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the case. For a 
helpful analysis of the issues and arguments raised in this case, see the Roundtable in the 
Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc, including Peter L. Strauss, Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 62 V AND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2009); 
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whether the appointments clause permits the agency's 
appointment to be vested in the SEC3 and whether the "good 
cause" restriction on its removal by the SEc4 violates Article II 
and separation-of-powers principles. 
At the level of constitutional doctrine, the fact of President 
Obama's defense of the constitutionality of the PCAOB might 
suggest his acquiescence in isolating executive officials from 
presidential supervision. At the very least, it appears to place his 
Administration at the opposite end of the spectrum on executive 
power from the Reagan Administration, which actively sought a 
Supreme Court ruling overturning the removal restrictions on 
independent agencies as violating the President's power under 
Article II. But the contrast between President Obama's and 
President Reagan's constitutional positions on independent 
agencies is revealing, I shall argue in this early reflection on 
President Obama's views on executive power, in part because it 
vastly overstates the differences in the powers these Presidents 
claimed to possess. 
A deeper look at President Obama's defense of the 
PCAOB, as reflected in his Solicitor General Elena Kagan's 
arguments to the Supreme Court, shows that it is premised on an 
assertion of a level of control over the agency, despite its 
independent status, that is roughly equivalent to what President 
Reagan's lawyers sought to achieve through a constitutional 
decision striking down congressionally-imposed good cause 
restrictions on the removal of independent agency officials. 
Presidents Obama and Reagan, in other words, claim a similar 
level of control over independent agencies, just on different legal 
grounds. For President Reagan, this control was warranted by 
Article II, and achievable only through constitutional 
invalidation of removal restrictions; for President Obama, the 
statutory good cause removal protections do not impede near­
plenary presidential supervision of the agency. 
What explains both this shift from constitutional to 
statutory ground-and basic convergence on the level of control 
these President's viewed as warranted? To be sure, Presidents 
face tremendous incentives to assert control over the federal 
bureaucracy.5 As Congress delegates more and more power to 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4)(A) (2006). 
4. Id. § 7211( e )( 6). 
5. See DAVIDE. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 4 
(2003). 
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federal agencies, including independent agencies, control over 
the federal bureaucracy is vital to a President's capacity to 
implement his policies.6 That shared interest might help explain 
the rough convergence between President Obama's and 
President Reagan's views on the level of control they assert. It 
does not explain, however, the shift in the legal grounds on 
which that control is asserted. The way in which President 
Reagan's lawyers litigated these issues, I argue, set in motion 
that shift in legal grounds; in particular, their litigation opening 
the door to the broad interpretation of good cause provisions 
that President Obama adopts. The shift might be seen as the 
Obama Administration capitalizing on the precedent created 
during the Reagan era. In that respect, it offers a cautionary tale 
for reading too much into the constitutional stance of a President 
without attention to underlying questions of statutory 
interpretation. At another level, Obama's lodging of his control 
on statutory grounds may suggest a different vision of the 
constitutional allocation of authority between Congress and the 
Executive. 
I. THE REAGAN LEGACY 
To appreciate the meaning of President Obama's defense of 
the PCAOB, it makes sense to look back to the Reagan-era 
precedent with which President Obama's defense engages, and 
in particular Morrison v. Olson.7 The Reagan Administration 
hoped to overturn the constitutionality of independent agencies, 
but in their attempt to avoid Supreme Court review of the 
independent counsel statute, which they thought would be a bad 
case to advance this challenge, the Reagan Administration 
lawyers ended up helping to establish the grounds for an analogy 
between the President's control over independent and executive 
agencies that President Obama makes central to his defense of 
the PCAOB.8 
President Reagan, we recall, campaigned on a broadly 
deregulatory platform.9 While implementing any presidential 
6. Id. 
7. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
8. In other writing, I examine how these and other choices made by the Reagan 
Administration's top lawyers influenced the outcome and meaning of Morrison v. Olson. 
See Kevin M. Stack, The Story of Morrison v. Olson: The Independent Counsel and 
Independent Agencies in Watergate's Wake, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
9. See, e. g., DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: How THE 
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agenda requires asserting control over the vast administrative 
state, implementing a platform based on deregulation makes 
that control all the more important. President Reagan made 
enduring strides in this direction, including centralizing review of 
significant regulatory activities of executive agencies in the 
Office of Management and Budget.10 In the Administration's 
effort to centralize regulatory policy within the White House, 
Reagan officials viewed independent agencies as a serious 
problem. As President Reagan's Solicitor General Charles Fried 
writes, their "independence of presidential authority was 
considered the extreme example, a kind of emblem, of one of 
the biggest obstacles to the administration's program."11 This 
view that independent agencies were critical barriers to the 
President's agenda helps explain the legal positions and 
strategies taken by President Reagan's Department of Justice­
and also contrasts sharply with President Obama's view as 
represented in the PCAOB litigation. 
Among the various routes to reducing or overcoming the 
resistance of these agencies to President Reagan's policies, top 
lawyers at the Department of Justice focused on their 
constitutionality.12 In particular, they sought a Supreme Court 
decision that "would hold that agency commissions served at the 
pleasure of the President, and that statutory limitations on their 
removal were unconstitutional. "13 This approach was premised 
on two legal grounds-statutory construction of good cause 
removal restrictions, and the powers Article II of the 
Constitution grants the President. 
The statutory construction question posed by good cause 
restrictions is what grounds for removal they allow: Mere lack of 
confidence in the office-holder? Policy disagreement? 
Misapplication of the law? Insubordination? Complete neglect 
of duty or ineptitude? It is clear that the Reagan Administration 
took good cause restrictions as providing significant protection 
from removal, including, it appears, protection from removal 
REAGAN REVOLUTION FAILED 103 (1986) ("Sweeping deregulation was another pillar 
of the supply-side platform. "). 
10. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U. S.C. § 601 
(1988). The basic structure of regulatory review initiated by Executive Order 12,291 has 
endured since the Executive Order was issued. 
11. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION­
A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 154-55 (1991). 
12. Executive Order 12,291 did not apply to independent agencies. See Exec. Order 
No. 12,291, § 2. 
13. FRIED, supra note 11, at 157. 
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based on policy disagreements. Indeed, if the Reagan 
Administration had believed that a policy disagreement was a 
sufficient ground for removal of an officer protected by a good 
cause restriction, then, at least in principle, independent agencies 
would not have posed such a significant a legal obstacle to the 
Administration's program. Of course, they still would pose a 
significant political obstacle, requiring a potentially distracting 
removal of officials perceived to be isolated from the President's 
policy preferences. 
By construing the good cause provisions as providing 
protection from removal based on a policy disagreement, the 
Reagan Administration took a relatively conventional view of 
the protections these removal restrictions provide, and one 
consistent with Humphrey's Executor v. United States,14 the 
leading decision on removal of principal officers at the time. In 
Humphrey's Executor, the Supreme Court made clear that the 
good cause restriction protecting the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) protected the Commissioners from termination at will, 
and held that these restrictions did not unconstitutionally 
infringe the President's executive power. The Federal Trade 
Commission Act granted Commissioners of the FTC seven-year 
terms, and vested the President with the right to remove them 
"for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."15 
President Roosevelt removed Commissioner Humphrey without 
a reason,16 and did not claim that his termination of Humphrey 
was based on one of the enumerated grounds of the removal 
provision.17 The Supreme Court held that the combination of the 
statute's specification of fixed terms in office and for cause 
provision limited the executive's power to terminate to "the 
causes enumerated, the existence of which none is claimed 
here."18 By implication, it is clear from Humphrey's Executor 
that simply terminating officer for no reason, as one could with 
an officer that served at the President's pleasure, does not 
constitute cause. But Humphrey's Executor itself left open the 
question of what constitutes cause, and specifically did not 
foreclose the possibility that policy disagreement could 
14. 295 U. S. 602 (1935). 
15. See id. at 622. 
16. President Roosevelt wrote to Commissioner Humphrey: "You will, I know, 
realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the 
policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and frankly, I think it is 
best for the people of this country that I should have a full confidence." Id. at 619. 
17. Id. at 626. 
18. Id. 
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constitute cause.19 In any event, given the ambiguity about what 
would constitute cause, the Reagan Administration appeared to 
adopt the conventional view that policy disagreement alone did 
not constitute cause. 
That statutory conclusion created the grounds for a serious 
constitutional question -namely, whether such a restriction 
constituted an unconstitutional infringement on the President's 
Article II power. On that question, the Reagan Administration 
sought to create the foundations for a Supreme Court decision 
that would overturn the constitutional holding of Humphrey's 
Executor. Humphrey's Executor had justified the good cause 
restrictions on doctrinally weak grounds. The Court rested the 
constitutionality of these removal restrictions on the 
characterization of the FTC as acting "in part quasi legislatively 
and in part quasi judicially."20 With regard to such officers, as 
opposed to those performing executive functions, the Court 
reasoned, Congress could constitutionally impose removal 
restrictions. This reasoning had two notorious problems. First, it 
was very hard to distinguish the functions the FTC served from 
those performed by many agencies. Second, it suggested that by 
virtue of the FTC's functions, it must exist somehow outside the 
executive branch (and thus presidential control). 
President Reagan's lawyers sought to implement a view of 
Article II under which there was no place for a set of officers 
that existed outside of the President's direct control. The theory 
of executive power that supported this view had several key 
elements. Although it is uncontroversial that Article -II vests 
executive power in a unitary President,21 the question is what 
follows from that choice as to Congress's authority to structure 
the executive branch. The Reagan Administration's lawyers 
argued that Article H's vesting of "executive power" in the 
President22 combined with the President's authority to "take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"23 required that the 
President have power to supervise and control the 
implementation of all federal law, and barred Congress from 
imposing restrictions on his power to fire executive officers at 
will. Aspects of that position appeared in opinions of the Office 
19. See, e.g. , Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, 84 CO LUM. L. 
REV. 573, 609 (1984). 
20. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U. S. at 628. 
21. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also Strauss, supra note 19, at 599. 
22. U. S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
23. Id. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
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of Legal Counsel in the early 1980s.24 Under that construction of 
Article II, there was simply no place for removal restrictions on 
executive officers. In short, the Reagan Administration accepted 
the implied statutory construction of Humphrey's Executor 
under which the removal provisions prevented firing 
independent agency heads for policy disagreements, but sought 
to overturn Humphrey's Executor's constitutional validation of 
this restriction. 
The Reagan Administration's effort to implement this 
constitutional vision, however, foundered in the Supreme Court 
on two occasions. The first setback came in Bowsher v. Synar,25 
in which the Court reviewed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. 
The Act granted the Comptroller General power to make 
binding decisions concerning budget reductions.26 Power to 
remove the Comptroller General, however, was vested in 
Congress.27 The Comptroller could_ be removed only by 
impeachment or by a joint resolution of Congress on the grounds 
of good cause.28 Because these removal provisions included a 
good cause restriction and vested removal authority in Congress, 
they were open to two different grounds for challenge, both of 
which the Justice Department asserted.29 The narrower ground 
was that Congress could not grant itself a role in the removal of 
executive officials. That ground would invalidate the removal 
provisions in the Act, but do little to advance the Reagan 
Administration's interest in a constitutional challenge to the 
removal restrictions applicable to most independent agencies. 
24. Removal of Members of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 6 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 180, 180 (1982) (arguing the primary functions of the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation were "executive in nature, and thus not such as would 
permit Congress constitutionally to insulate its members from the President's removal 
power, " despite the Council's statutory designation as independent); Litigation 
Authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Title VII Suits Against 
State and Local Governmental Entities, 7 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 57, 64 (1983) (EEOC 
could not take a contrary litigation position to the Attorney General because the "whole 
of the Executive power . . .  is vested exclusively in the President "); Constitutionality of 
Statute Requiring Executive Agency to Report Directly to Congress, 6 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 632, 632 (1982) ("Separation of powers requires that the President have ultimate 
control over subordinate officials who perform purely executive functions, which 
includes the right to supervise and review the work of such officials. "). 
25. 478 U. S. 714 (1986). 
26. Id. at 718. 
27. See 31 U. S.C. § 703(e)(l)(B) (1982); see also Bowsher, 478 U. S. at 727-28. 
28. Bowsher, 478 U. S. at 720, 728. 
29. See Brief for the United States at 31-32, 48, Bowsher, 478 U. S. 714 (Nos. 85-
1377, 85-1378 & 85-1379). 
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The broader ground was that the President must have 
authority to remove the Comptroller General at will because the 
Comptroller General exercises executive power. "Whatever may 
be the nature and scope of the functions that Congress 
constitutionally may remove from the general administration of 
the laws and assign to an agency composed of members who are 
independent of the President's control," Solicitor General 
Charles Fried argued in Bowsher, "Congress clearly cannot vest 
in such an officer the authority to intrude upon and effectively 
direct the execution of the laws by the President. "30 Embracing 
that position would open the door to a direct challenge to the 
constitutionality of independent agencies, many of which engage 
in execution of the law. 
The Supreme Court, as we know, opted for the narrower 
ground, namely, that "Congress cannot reserve for itself the 
power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the 
laws. "31 The Court also held that the removal power of Congress, 
even though restricted to good cause, rendered the Comptroller 
General "subservient to Congress."32 In the end, the Bowsher 
decision, although a technical victory for the Reagan Justice 
Department, represented a setback for the Department's 
broader interest in implementing a strongly unitary conception 
of the President's powers. The Court had an opportunity to 
establish a critical building block for that larger constitutional 
vision, and it declined. Bowsher's treatment of the Comptroller 
as subservient to Congress despite the good cause protection, 
however, suggested the possibility that these restrictions might 
be construed to provide little restraint on the President's power 
to remove an official for a policy disagreement.33 
The Supreme Court took up that suggestion, a suggestion 
which becomes central to President Obama's defense in 
PCAOB, in Morrison v. Olson, but used it to deal the Reagan 
Administration a second set-back in its effort to overturn the 
constitutionality of removal restrictions. Prior to the actual 
litigation of the independent counsel statute in the case that 
became Morrison v. Olson, the Reagan Justice Department 
30. Id. at 48. 
31. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726. 
32. Id. at 730. 
33. In 1986, Professor Geoffrey Miller elaborated the possibility of a President 
construing a good cause provision to permit removal for failure to comply with the 
President's instructions. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. 
REV. 41, 44. 
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devised a strategy aimed at thwarting review of the independent 
counsel statute while allowing pending investigations to 
continue.34 It was that strategy that prepared the ground in 
unanticipated ways for the Supreme Court's decision in 
Morrison v. Olson to uphold the independent counsel statute, 
and ultimately for President Obama's defense of the PCAOB. 
The Reagan lawyers understood that it was important to 
avoid Supreme Court review of the independent counsel statute 
for a variety of reasons. To begin with, unlike almost every other 
independent agency, the independent counsel had strong public 
appeal as a symbol of Watergate reforms. Moreover, the fact 
that Lt. Col. Oliver North brought the first significant 
constitutional challenge to the independent counsel statute 
compounded the Administration's general misapprehension 
about litigating good cause removal provisions in the context of 
the independent counsel statute. While Reagan Administration 
officials surely wished for the independent counsel statute to 
disappear, even among independent counsel cases, the North 
litigation was the worst vehicle to mount a challenge. The Iran­
Contra investigation had captured public attention and would be 
a "terrible case[] in which to challenge a law that the public was 
told guaranteed impartial justice. "35 
In hopes of avoiding review, the Attorney General offered 
independent counsels "parallel" appointments within the 
Department of Justice as special prosecutors, under the same 
statutory authority that had been used to create the Watergate 
special prosecutor. The regulations establishing the parallel 
appointment granted the counsel identical authority and 
jurisdiction to that as provided by the independent counsel 
statute,36 but were issued under the Attorney General's statutory 
authority to appoint ad hoc special prosecutors, who could be 
removed at will. If independent counsels accepted these parallel 
34. Office of Independent Counsel, General Powers and Establishment of 
Independent Counsel-Iran/Contra, 52 Fed. Reg. 7270, 7270 (March 10, 1987) (codified 
at 28 C.F.R. §§ 600 & 601 (1988)) (Attorney General Meese introduced the parallel 
appointment regulations with a summary saying, "I have found it advisable to assure the 
courts, Congress and the American people that this investigation will proceed in a clearly 
authorized and constitutionally valid form regardless of the eventual outcome of the 
North litigation [challenging the independent counsel statute.]"). 
35. FRIED, supra note 11, at 137. 
36. See General Powers and Establishment of Independent Counsel-Iran/Contra, 
52 Fed. Reg. at 7270-273. On the provisions for removal protection, compare 28 U. S.C. § 
596 (2006) with the parallel provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(c)-(d) (2009); see also In re 
Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting the parallel in removal 
protection). 
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appointments, the Department reasoned, they could render 
moot the question of the constitutionality of the independent 
counsel statute, because the investigation had a separate 
authorization furnished by the parallel appointments. 
With regard to the North investigation, the strategy worked. 
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh accepted the parallel 
appointment the day it was offered.37 The United States then 
argued that North's challenge to the constitutionality of the 
independent counsel statute was not reviewable. The D.C. 
Circuit agreed with the United States.38 At the center of the D.C. 
Circuit's reasoning was its conclusion that there was no 
difference in the actions Walsh would take if he were acting 
solely on the basis of the authority vested in him by the Attorney 
General and those he would take with the addition of the 
protections of the independent counsel statute, and therefore no 
• 
• • 39 pomt m review. 
This is a startling conclusion, as Judge Stephen Williams' 
partial dissent recognized.40 To reach it, the D.C. Circuit had to 
take the view that statutory good cause restrictions did not 
provide additional, or at least significant, independence. Indeed, 
based on the D.C. Circuit's decision, the position of an 
independent counsel, removable by the Attorney General only 
for good cause, becomes the rough equivalent of a special 
prosecutor, removable by the Attorney General at will. But once 
that is true, it is unclear how much protection or insulation from 
presidential influence statutory good cause removal provisions 
provide. As a result, this position undermines the starting 
premise of the Reagan Administration's legal challenge to 
independent agencies-that agencies protected by good cause 
removal provisions were the "biggest obstacle" to the 
implementation of presidential policy. But it also suggests that 
the President has much of the control the Reagan 
Administration's lawyers had sought, just not through an express 
constitutional overruling of good cause restrictions. 
When the independent counsel in a separate investigation of 
Theodore Olson declined the Attorney General's parallel 
appointment, and the D.C. Circuit held that the independent 
counsel statute was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court review 
37. In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d at 52-53. 
38. Id. at 62. 
39. Id. at 59-62. 
40. Id. at 63-69 (Williams, J., concurring and dissenting). 
2010] DEFENSE OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 593 
of the statute became inevitable. Interestingly, in the Supreme 
Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson, the Court embraced the 
analogy between special prosecutor and independent counsel, 
despite their different removal protections. This analogy first 
arose in the Court's analysis of Olson's challenge to the statute 
under the appointments clause. Among other things, Olson 
argued that the independent counsel was a principal officer 
under the appointments clause, and therefore her appointment 
must be vested in the President.41 The Court concluded that the 
independent counsel was an inferior, not principal officer, 
supporting this conclusion with a comparison to the Watergate 
Special Prosecutor. The Court noted that the Watergate Special 
Prosecutor, "whose authority was similar to that of appellant," 
was considered in United States v. Nixon to be a "subordinate 
officer."42 The Watergate Special Prosecutor was (notoriously) 
removable at will. Thus, by suggesting that the Watergate 
Special Prosecutor's inferior officer status was consistent with 
the conclusion that the independent counsel was also an inferior 
officer, the Court declined to read the good cause removal 
provision as creating a sharp distinction between the two 
prosecutors. The fact that they were both removable by the 
Attorney General mattered more than the statutory good cause 
removal protection that the independent counsel enjoyed. The 
parallel appointments (and the D.C. Circuit's conclusion in the 
North litigation that the parallel appointment prevented 
constitutional review of the Act) appeared to domesticate the 
very aspect of the independent counsel-statutory independence 
based on good cause removal protection -most likely to 
distinguish the counsel from the constitutionally uncontroversial 
special prosecutor. 
When the Court turned to consider whether the good cause 
protections were unconstitutional infringements on the 
President's power, it flatly rejected the view that the exercise of 
executive power itself prohibits Congress from imposing good 
cause removal restrictions. Casting aside the doctrine sug&ested 
by its previous decisions in Myers v. United States4 and 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States44 that the validity of 
removal restrictions turned on whether or not the officer 
engaged in purely executive functions, or quasi-legislative quasi-
41. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 673 (1988). 
42. Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 694 n.8 (1974)). 
43. 272 U. S. 52 (1926). 
44. 295 U. S. 602 (1935). 
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adjudicative functions,45 the Court took the central question to 
be whether "the removal restrictions are of such a nature that 
they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional 
duty."46 Applying this functional test, the Court rejected the idea 
that good cause removal restrictions amounted to much of a 
constraint on the President. Even with the good cause removal 
restriction, the Court ventured that the Attorney General retains 
"ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently 
performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that 
comports with the provisions of the Act. "47 At this point, one can 
hear in the background the analogy between the special 
prosecutor and the independent counsel. If the Attorney 
General's authority over both prosecutors make them 
subordinate, as suggested by the Court's reasoning under the 
appointments clause, then it would be difficult to conclude that 
the removal provision itself obstructs the Attorney General's 
control over the independent counsel (.fsutting aside, of course, 
that that was the point of the provision). 8 
What emerges from Morrison v. Olson, the ultimate 
outcome of the Reagan Administration's litigation of the statute 
of independent agencies, is a constitutional validation of the 
good cause removal provisions, but a validation that undermines 
much of the protection those provisions were thought to ensure. 
Indeed, following Morrison, it would be hard to imagine that 
Reagan officials would still view independent agencies as the 
most significant legal obstacle to the implementation to their 
program. Rather, the Court has suggested that even with good 
cause protections, the President retains "ample" authority over 
them. It is that victory for presidential influence that frames the 
Obama Administration's defense of the PCAOB. 
II. OBAMA'S DEFENSE OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 
When a President defends the constitutionality of a statute 
that imposes restrictions on his powers, it is worth carefully 
45. Id. at 689. 
46. Id. at 691. For an earlier, quite similar articulation of this view, see Peter 
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 609-616 (1984). 
47. Morrison, 487 U. S. at 692. 
48. See S. REP. No. 95-170, at 65-66, reprinted in 1978 U. S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4281-82 
(stating that the independent counsel statute aimed to create a prosecutor who is 
"independent, both in reality and appearance, from the President and the Attorney 
General"). 
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attending to the way in which he or she does so. President 
Obama's defense of the constitutionality of the PCAOB, as 
revealed by Solicitor General defense in the brief of the United 
States and also in oral argument in the Supreme Court in 
PCAOB, is no exception. Solicitor General Kagan's defense of 
the PCAOB's removal protections takes up the invitation of 
both Bowsher and Morrison to construe good cause removal 
provisions very broadly.49 The extent of her equivocation as to 
what protection removal provisions provide is most clearly 
revealed in her argument that seeks to bring the PCAOB 's 
under the mantel of Morrison. 
Solicitor General Kagan's first line of defense for the 
PCAOB's removal protections was to rely on Humphrey's 
Executor, in essence saying that Humphrey's Executor is 
sufficient to validate the PCAOB. This argument has two basic 
premises. The first is relatively uncontroversial: Humphrey's 
Executor clearly validates the good cause restrictions that are 
presumed to apfolY to the President's ability to remove the SEC 
Commissioners. 0 Indeed, Humphrey's Executor held that a good 
cause restriction preserves a constitutionally sufficient level of 
control by the President. The second step turns on the scope of 
the SEC's control over the PCAOB. Solicitor General Kagan 
argued that, despite the good-cause restriction protecting the 
PCAOB, the SEC has extremely broad control over the Board, a 
view invited by the broad powers granted by the statute over the 
PCAOB to the SEC.51 She specifically argued that the good 
cause restriction governing the PCAOB itself "affords the 
Commission broad authority over individual Board members for 
conduct at the heart of their statutory responsibilities. "52 
Solicitor General Kagan puts these two premises together to 
reach the conclusion that the double good-cause removal 
provision is constitutional because it provides ample authority 
for the President to take care that the laws are faithfully 
49. With regard to the independent counsel statute, John Manning has suggested 
that, in order to avoid serious constitutional questions about the President's control over 
the independent counsel, there are grounds to construe that good cause provision to 
allow substantial presidential supervision (or at least to hesitate before construing the 
removal provision more restrictively). See John F. Manning, The Independent Counsel 
Statute: Reading "Good Cause" in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1288, 1335 
(1999). In a sense, President Obama's defense of PCAOB takes this same approach to 
the removal provisions in protecting PCAOB. 
50. Brief for the United States at 48, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, No. 08-861 (Oct. 13, 2009). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 51 (commenting on§ 7217(d)(3)). 
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executed:53 If the President has constitutionally sufficient control 
over the SEC, and the SEC has plenary control over the Board, 
then the President should have sufficient control over the Board. 
As Solicitor General Kagan anticipates in her brief for the 
United States, Morrison v. Olson poses a difficulty for this 
position. Morrison is the Supreme Court's most extensive recent 
consideration of a good-cause provision that vests removal in an 
officer other than the President. Framed in this way-as a 
judgment about good cause provision that vest removal in a 
officer other than the President-the application of Morrison is 
difficult to avoid. Chief Justice Roberts made precisely this point 
in oral argument, suggesting that Humphrey's Executor alone is 
not sufficient to validate the good cause provision in PCAOB. 
Speaking to Solicitor General Kagan, the Chief Justice 
commented, "But you have to add to Humphrey's, Perkins54 and 
Morrison. Humphrey's says you can limit the President's 
removal power. That doesn't get you down to the Board. You 
have to also say the principal officers, there can be limits on their 
removal authority over the board members. "55 It is the 
application of Morrison, in other words, that "get[ s] you down to 
the Board. "56 
But once the analysis in comparison to Morrison is launched 
on those terms, Morrison creates a larger challenge for 
defending the PCAOB. Whereas the removal power over the 
independent counsel was vested in the Attorney General, the 
paradigm of an officer serving at the President's pleasure, 
PCAOB 's removal is vested in the SEC, itself an independent 
agency. This difference confronted Solicitor General Kagan with 
a stark choice. On the one hand, she could simply jettison 
Morrison, an unappealing prospect. Or she could try to fit the 
PCAOB under Morrison. 
To take the second course, however, would require likening 
the President's authority over the Attorney General to the 
President's authority over the SEC. That is what Solicitor 
General Kagan did. Addressing Morrison,57 Solicitor General 
53. Id. at 48. 
54. United States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483 (1886) (upholding Congress's power to 
impose good cause restrictions on removal of inferior officers whose appointments are 
vested in heads of departments). 
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Free Enterprise Fund, No. 08-861; see also 
id. at 47 ("It goes further (than Humphrey's Executor] because you have got to rely on 
the SEC to get to the Board. So there you have got to rely on Perkins and Morrison. "). 
56. Id. 
57. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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Kagan argued in the brief for the United States, "just as the 
Attorney General had the power to remove an independent 
counsel for good cause (487 U.S. at 663), the SEC has the power 
to remove members of the PCAOB for 'good cause shown.'"58 
The strategic motivation for this analogy is clear. If the analogy 
holds, then Morrison v. Olson provides strong support for the 
constitutionality of the removal restrictions applicable to the 
PCAOB: If good cause removal of an inferior officer may be 
constitutionally vested in the Attorney General (which Morrison 
establishes), and the President has authority over the SEC that is 
analogous to his authority over the Attorney General (Solicitor 
General Kagan's implication), then the removal restrictions for 
the PCAOB are unproblematic. 
But the Solicitor General's implication is an important and 
revealing one. If the President's control over independent 
agencies is substantially similar to his control over at-will 
appointees, the thrust of the distinction between independent 
and executive agencies which Reagan Administration lawyers 
sought to overturn has dissipated. Solicitor General Kagan's 
arguments in the PCAOB litigation reach nearly that far. At oral 
argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked Solicitor General Kagan 
how much protection good cause protections provide. Her 
answers were equivocal: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Can the President pick 
up the phone and fire the SEC commissioners? 
GENERAL KAGAN: The President can pick up the 
phone and fire the SEC commissioners for cause, 
however 'cause' has been defined. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What do they have to 
say about the theory that the SEC Commissioners can 
be removed by the President? 
GENERAL KAGAN: I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, that 
nobody has contested that question. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And you are not 
contesting it? 
GENERAL KAGAN: And we are not contesting the 
question that the SEC commissioners, themselves, are 
58. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 49. 
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removable by the President for cause under, I would 
say, a very broad for cause provision, in the way that 
Bowsher suggested, not something that is niggling and 
technical. 59 
In view of the comparison between the Attorney General 
and the SEC in the brief for United States, it is easy to 
understand how Chief Justice Roberts could have taken the 
Solicitor General to be putting into issue the grounds for 
removal of SEC commissioners. The Solicitor General's 
comparison between the SEC and the Attorney General does 
just that. Moreover, her emphasis on the "plenary control" the 
SEC has over the PCAOB,60 despite the good cause removal 
provision, also supports the idea that the President has similar 
plenary authority over the SEC. If one good cause provisions 
allows plenary control, why wouldn't another, especially where, 
as in the case of the SEC, good cause protection has to be 
implied from the fixed terms of the Commissioners?61 
Solicitor General Kagan's account of the good cause 
provision protecting the PCAOB ultimately takes the position 
that Morrison suggested: while good cause protections are not 
unconstitutional, they must be construed to provide significant 
authority for the President to terminate (and thus to practically 
direct) the officials they protect. The seeds of this position 
appear in Bowsher, where the Court read the Congress's power 
to terminate the Comptroller General for cause as creating a 
subservience on the part of the Comptroller General.62 But it was 
the analogy between special prosecutor and independent counsel 
created in the Regan Administration's attempt to avoid review 
of the independent counsel statute, that put good cause 
restrictions and at-will appointment on a similar footing. The 
Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson amplified that parity, but 
did so only as to the independent counsel's protections, not 
those of an independent agency. Morrison left open the question 
of whether that same broadening of what constitutes good cause 
applies, not just to the Attorney General's supervision of the 
independent counsel, but also to the construction of good cause 
provisions more generally. 
59. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 46, 52. 
60. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 42. 
61. No statutory provision grants the Commissioners of the SEC good-cause 
removal protection. The SEC Commissioners are appointed for fixed, staggered terms. 
See 15 U. S.C. § 78d(a) (2006). 
62. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 727 (1986). 
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Solicitor General Kagan provides a positive answer. On the 
one hand, her answer contradicts the conventional 
understanding, shared by the Reagan Department of Justice, of 
these provisions. Indeed, as Justice Scalia noted in the oral 
argument of the PCA 0 B case, advisers to President Reagan, of 
which he was one, took good cause provisions to impose a 
serious constraint on presidential influence: 
MR. LAMKEN: Your Honor, the President has the 
same control over the SEC's provision over the Board 
as he has over everything else that falls within the SEC's 
jurisdiction. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Which is nothing, which is nothing. 
I -when I was-I advised the President, you can't 
interfere with-I think, if the President called up the 
FCC and said, I want you to rule this way, I want this 
kind of rule from the FCC, I think there would be an 
impeachment motion in Congress.63 
On the other hand, Solicitor General Kagan's answer also results 
in roughly the same practical authority for the President over 
independent agencies as a constitutional invalidation of good 
cause provisions might. It reaches this result, however, through 
statutory construction. President Obama's defense of the 
constitutionality of the PCAOB thus simultaneously contradicts 
the Reagan Administration's view that independent agencies 
infringe the President's Article II powers and embraces the 
position they sought to establish that the President retains 
substantial, almost plenary, control over agencies despite their 
"independent" status. 
III. CONCLUSION 
What are we to make of this shift? To be sure, it could be 
well explained by a variety of considerations of legal strategy 
and the context of the case. The Supreme Court's decision to 
review the case thrust the Obama Administration in the position 
of having to take a view on this controversial issue. Given that 
the Administration was not inclined politically or legally to see 
the PCAOB invalidated, it made sense for Solicitor General 
Kagan to emphasize the scope of authority Bowsher and 
Morrison seemed to suggest removal provisions allow the 
President. Moreover, the Sar banes-Oxley Act of 2002 provided 
63. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 58-59. 
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truly broad powers to the SEC with regard to its supervision of 
the PCAOB, including requiring the SEC's approval before 
PCAOB's rules become effective,64 requiring the PCAOB to 
conduct investigations of registered accounting firms in 
accordance with SEC rules,65 making disciplinary sanctions of the 
PCAOB subject to de nova review by the SEC, vesting the SEC 
with authority to rescind the PCAOB's enforcement authority,66 
among other things. 
But Solicitor General Kagan's position may also reflect a 
deeper view about the relative allocation of power between 
Congress and the President. By defending the scope of the 
President's control under statute, in principle Solicitor General 
Kagan provides a space for congressional dialogue as to the 
structure of relations among the executive branch that would not 
be allowed by most constitutional rulings invalidating the good 
cause restriction. A construction of the Sweeping Clause67 
generous to congressional power may underpin Solicitor 
General Kagan's statutory defense of the PCAOB. That view 
might be political expedient for a political party that has had 
greater influence over Congress than the Presidency in recent 
decades. Solicitor General Kagan's defense of the PCAOB's, 
while consistent with a reading of the Sweeping Clause that 
grants Congress wide latitude in structuring the executive 
branch, does not require it. As a result, a conclusion about the 
Obama Administration's view of the balance between executive 
and legislative authority under the Constitution will have be 
supported on other grounds. 
In the end, we can see that Morrison and PCAOB hold 
parallel lessons for the Reagan and Obama Administrations. 
The Reagan Administration sought to avoid litigating Morrison 
precisely because the independent counsel statute held too 
strong a prospect for a Supreme Court decision validating 
removal restrictions. While the Reagan Administration did lose 
in Morrison, the Court ruled in a way that granted the 
Administration much of the legal grounds for presidential 
control that it sought to exercise. 
64. 15 u.s.c. § 7217(b)(2) (2006). 
65. Id. § 7215(b )(1). 
66. Id. § 7217(d)(1). 
67. See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have Power . . .  [t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."). 
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The PCA 0 B litigation was also uninvited by President 
Obama. The Obama Administration sought to avoid a Supreme 
Court hearing in PCA 0 B in part because it is difficult to see a 
clear path to upholding the agency based on the Supreme 
Court's precedent. Moreover, the agency, staffed by highly paid 
accountants, had little public appeal. The Obama 
Administration's defense of PCAOB embraces the full scope of 
flexibility in interpreting good cause restrictions that Morrison 
invited. But, like the Reagan Administration, the Obama 
Administration may well also face defeat in this unwelcome 
litigation. 
